Introduction
Recent events have placed the United Nations Charter system regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum) under considerable strain. States are increasingly challenging its boundaries. For example, there is fundamental disagreement within the international community as to whether it is possible to reconcile with the terms of the Charter such forceful actions as the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. 1 Moreover, recent strategies designed to address the threat of global terrorism, in particular the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, are at odds with orthodox views as to the limits of preventative force. 2 There is, however, remarkable consensus on one issue, that despite any uncertainty as to the legal framework governing a forceful response it must be both necessary and proportionate. 3 The twin requirements of necessity and proportionality owe their genesis to an exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the United States and the United Kingdom in relation to the 1837 Caroline incident and were articulated in the context of preventative action. 4 Subsequently, these constraints came to 5 The International Court of Justice has considered necessity and proportionality on several occasions although never in detail, , 1975) . 8 The treaty norm of proportionality is contained in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1977 (Protocol I), 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 3I and prohibits an attack "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated". The norm is widely regarded as reflected in customary international law. be accepted as applicable to all situations involving the use of force. Despite consensus as to the relevance of these criteria to the Charter system, for many years necessity and proportionality played no real role in debates over the legitimacy of the use of force. 5 They were referred to almost as an incantation and their detailed operation awaited further clarification in the practice of States.
The 'immediacy' aspect of necessity has recently assumed a high profile in scholarly assessments of the legitimacy of the expanded doctrine of pre-emptive or preventative action in the face of the threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 6 In contrast to necessity, its twin criterion, proportionality, remains neglected. 7 To date States and commentators have failed to transcend rhetoric and accord a concrete role to proportionality as a restraining influence on the conduct of conflict. Perhaps this lack of development of proportionality in the law governing the use of force, to some extent can be attributed to the existence of a separate well-developed rule of proportionality in relation to civilian losses in the regime governing the conduct of hostilities, International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 8 The IHL rule of proportionality regulates the detailed or tactical aspects of the conduct of armed conflict. In that regime proportionality constrains the losses that are legitimate in attacking a military target, but it does not incorporate a consideration of whether the
